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A society in which everybody is the same at the same stage of the
life-cycle will exhibit substantial income and wealth inequality.
We use this idea to empirically quantify natural inequality -
the share of observed inequality attributable to life-cycle pro-
files of income and wealth. We document that recent increases
in inequality in the United States and other developed countries
are larger than observed rates would suggest. Extrapolating our
measures forward suggests that natural inequalities will fluctu-
ate over the next 20 years before settling to a new higher level.
JEL: D31, J10
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1The most equal society will exhibit a substantial degree of income and
wealth inequality. Even in the absence of differences in talent, individuals
approaching retirement will be substantially wealthier than those who
are younger. Moreover, experience and seniority mean that older workers
will have higher wages than their younger colleagues. Jointly, such life-
cycle aspects of income and wealth give rise to a degree of inequality that
is ‘natural’ in all societies – even if each individual over the course of the
life-cycle is exactly the same as any other individual.
An early version of this argument was made by Atkinson (1971), who
suggested that the distribution of wealth should be expected to be un-
equal solely due to differences in accumulated savings over the life-cycle.
In a related contribution Paglin (1975) uses an argument similar to Atkin-
son’s to suggest that popular measures of inequality such as the Gini co-
efficient should be corrected for the age structure inherent in income and
wealth profiles. While Paglin’s suggestion for a correction was not uncon-
troversial,1 the core of his argument – that inequality measures should be
adjusted for the underlying life-cycle structure – still holds.
A powerful new body of evidence (particularly Piketty (2003), Piketty
and Saez (2003) and more recently, Atkinson et al. (2011), Piketty and
Saez (2014) and Saez and Zucman (2016)) has transformed our under-
standing, and highlighted the societal implications, of long-term trends
in inequality. However, following Atkinson (1971) and Paglin (1975) it is
important to understand the extent to which these trends reflect changes
in natural inequality due to changes in nations’ demographics. This pa-
per addresses this need by taking the life-cycle argument to the data.
1See the three rounds of comments and replies generated by his paper.
2In doing so we document how much of the variation in income and
wealth inequality is due solely to life-cycle effects and by implication how
much reflects other factors. Using harmonised micro-data for the United
States and other developed countries, we show that even in the absence
of any inequality between individuals of the same age group, societies ex-
hibit substantial degrees of income and wealth inequality. In particular,
we show that the level due to life-cycle effects only (natural inequality)
accounts for around one third of income inequality in the United States,
with the remaining two-thirds attributable to differences between indi-
viduals, the effects of institutions, and so forth. Moreover, between the
early 1970s and the early 1990s, the level of natural inequality increased
by around 2 percentage points. The mid 1990s marks a turning point,
natural inequality declined slightly, however this has been more than off-
set by large increases in excess inequality. This is in contrast to the other
countries we study where the level of excess inequality is often lower and
with a less pronounced upwards trend. Results for wealth show that nat-
ural wealth inequality has varied little over the last 20 years in the US as
observed inequality has increased rapidly. However, life-cycle effects can
explain a considerable amount of the cross-country variation in wealth
inequality.
We utilise harmonised micro data from the Luxembourg Income Study
(LIS) and the Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS) for our analysis. Impor-
tantly for our purpose, these studies contain data which have harmonised
variable definitions to allow meaningful comparison across countries as
well as over time.
3Our aim of quantifying the effect of changes in demography on in-
equality is similar to that of the early work of Mookherjee and Shorrocks
(1982). Like them we will use the Formby and Seaks (1980) modifica-
tion of the Paglin-Gini. Despite only very limited aggregated data they
were nethertheless able to provide evidence that that rises in inequality
in Great Britain over the period 1965-1980 could be almost entirely at-
tributed to increasing ‘natural’ inequality. A key advantage of the much
improved quality and coverage of harmonised data now available, is that
we can see this trend in its proper historical context – as a temporary
phenomenon soon to be reversed.2
There has been relatively little recent work looking at the role of de-
mography in inequality. Thus, by documenting the relationship between
the demographic structure and the natural rate of inequality we con-
tribute to the important recent literature on trends in inequality. We
assess the impact of the disproportionate size of the Baby Boom gen-
eration on natural inequality and study how natural inequality should
be expected to change, ceteris paribus as the demographic structure con-
verges to its long-run equilibrium. This exercise suggests that the bulge
on the demographic pyramid generated by the Baby Boom is depress-
ing natural inequality. Hence, in the future, as the demographic pyra-
mid settles into its long-run equilibrium, wealth and income inequality
will increase. Perhaps worryingly, this process will accelerate further the
trend of increasing inequality documented by the seminal contributions
of Piketty (2003), Piketty and Saez (2003), Atkinson et al. (2011), Piketty
2Related is the work of Brewer and Wren-Lewis (2016) who decompose trends
in UK inequality by income source and demographic characteristics to show that in-
creases in inequality amongst those in employment have been ameliorated by rela-
tively low unemployment, and more generous pension provision.
4and Saez (2014), Saez and Zucman (2016). In that sense, our paper con-
tributes to the extant literature on inequality trends by highlighting that
demographic forces will exacerbate the upward trends in inequality.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section sketches the empirical
argument for, and formalizes the notion of, natural inequality, and intro-
duces the life-cycle adjusted Gini. Section II takes the notion of natural
inequality to data. It focuses first on income inequality in the US, before
considering a panel of countries. These results suggest, that particularly
in the US, that ignoring changes in natural rates of inequality over the last
20 years may mean underestimating increases in inequality. The last part
of Section II shows that comparatively little of wealth inequality is due to
natural inequality. Section III turns to the future and simulates the evolu-
tion of natural inequality as countries return to their demographic steady
states following the Baby Boom. The results suggest that in many coun-
tries there will be substantial increases in natural inequality over the next
20 years. We close with a brief conclusion. The Appendix summarises the
data used and presents additional results.
I. Natural Rates of Inequality
Our focus on the level of inequality due solely to life-cycle factors is
directly related to the prominent literature that studies the determinants
of the distributions of earnings and wealth. For example, Huggett et al.
(2011) consider how shocks received at different life stages affect lifetime
income. The distribution of wealth is studied by Cagetti and De Nardi
(2006) who study a quantitative model of occupational choice with the
potential for entrepreneurship and study the role bequests and restric-
5tions on investment play in determining wealth inequality. See also Neal
and Rosen (2000) for a review and Huggett et al. (2006) for a more recent
example attempting to match the extent to which more or less sophisti-
cated life-cycle models can explain observed income-inequality. In this
class of models life-cycle inequality is determined by the choice of pa-
rameters, often calibrated to US data, and the form of the model. As
in Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), this approach allows for sophisticated
analyses of the interaction of different features of an economy but any
estimates depend on how well the model corresponds to reality and how
precisely the parameters are chosen. Our approach is different, we use
micro-data to study the empirical importance of life-cycle inequality for
income and wealth without recourse to additional assumptions. One way
we contribute to this literature is by providing empirical evidence as to
the extent to which income and wealth inequality should be attributed to
life-cycle effects in this type of model.
To fix ideas we follow Atkinson (1971) and start with a stylized expo-
sition of the levels of income and wealth inequality that would prevail if
the only difference between individuals is that they are at a different stage
of their life cycle. Starting with income inequality, consider the following
process of labour income:
(1) W (v, t) = E(t − v)w(t),
whereW (v, t) is the income at time t of an individual born at time v, w(t)
is the economy wide wage rate and E(t−v) is an individual scaling factor
that creates a life-cycle pattern in labour income. E(t−v) can be driven by
many factors, which, for the sake of brevity we do not model separately.
6Indeed, for the current purpose it suffices to acknowledge that E(t − v)
can contain experience effects by which more senior workers earn more
than junior workers but also institutional factors such as a social security
system that redistributes income from workers to retirees.
This makes clear the argument of Atkinson (1971) and Paglin (1975)
that the standard egalitarian view of complete income and wealth equal-
ity implies either substantial redistribution from old to young, or that
there is no return to experience, etc. Indeed a society in which one never
accumulates assets or develops is quite alien. This implies, as argued
by Paglin (1975), that the correct benchmark is the level of inequality
due only to life-cycle effects.3 However, the degree of inequality is de-
termined not only by how much richer the old are than the young, but
their relative number. The demographic structure of the UK in 1969, as
analysed by Atkinson (1971), is both quite different to that of today given
3The Paglin Gini differs from other modifications of the Gini in that it maintains
the same egalitarian benchmark. Other approaches include that of Alma˚s et al. (2011a)
who provide an alternative adjustment of the inequality measures, focusing on unfair
inequality. This approach replaces the assumption incarnate in the standard Gini in-
dex or Lorenz curve that fairness implies complete egalitarianism with a more general
framework that better corresponds to intuitive and philosophical conceptions of a fair
society. For example, unfair inequality may see as fair that those who work harder or
who are better qualified earn more. In their empirical analysis Alma˚s et al. (2011a)
use rich micro-data to study departures from the fair income distribution for Nor-
way. Generalizing standard approaches to other definitions of inequality extends in
important ways our toolkit but is quite different to the approach of our paper, which
maintains the standard egalitarian definition of inequality. It is also quite different in
practical terms, as a key advantage of our measure is that it can be derived without
having recourse to registry data with variables such as IQ, thereby enabling us to com-
pare excess inequality internationally. We only need data on ages and income/wealth
and not the detailed data used by Alma˚s et al. (2011a). More similar to this paper is
Alma˚s et al. (2011b) who propose an alternative method of adjusting the Gini coeffi-
cient for life-cycle effects, that can better account for correlations between, say age and
education levels. This is a substantial advantage, but again necessitates detailed micro-
data normally not available such as parental earnings, that the effects of age and other
factors may be precisely estimated.
7improvements in longevity but is also different to that elsewhere, then
and now.











































20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
Age
Relative Size of Cohort Average Labour Income (in $1000)
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), year 2016
Notes: The left y-axis corresponds to the relative size of each age cohort for men in
2016, represented by the light blue bars. The right y-axis in the average labour income
in $1000 dollars for each group. Thus the red line maps the average earnings profile.
The bulge in the relative population size around ages 45 to 60 is the impact of the Baby
Boom generation distorting the standard demographic pyramid.
We develop the above intuition by sketching out the profile of income
and cohort shares for the United States using data from the Luxembourg
Income Study (LIS). The income profile, contained in the solid line of Fig-
ure 1, reflects the average income of men in each age group. There we see
that income has the familiar hump-shaped profile. The bars in Figure 1
8trace out the associated cohort sizes by age. This provides the relatively
uniform demographic pyramid associated with high income countries.
However, in contrast to a steady-state demographic structure, where we
would expect a smooth decrease in cohort size as age increases, we no-
tice the ragged structure of the triangle - due to, for instance, the Baby
Boom. Importantly, we can combine the income profile and the size of
the cohorts in Figure 1 to calculate a Gini coefficient. This simply in-
volves using cohort averages, x¯i and x¯j in place of individual data, and
weighting by cohort sizes pi and pj , in an otherwise standard expression




pipj |x¯i − x¯j |
2x
.
This provides a value of 0.16, thus attesting to the idea of a natural level
of income inequality. For wealth we provide a similar analysis in Fig-
ure 2 where we sketch out the age profile of mean wealth for the United
States using data from the Luxembourg Wealth Study. If anything, the
wealth profile is more hump-shaped over the life-cycle. This translates
into higher natural inequality with the Gini coefficient of wealth being
0.38.
For brevity, we formalize the reasoning developed above and summa-
rize the main conclusions from the model in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The Gini coefficient of income (wealth) is positive in the
presence of a non-flat life-cycle income (wealth) profile.
Corollary 1.1. Perfect income (wealth) equality implies a flat income
(wealth) profile over the life-cycle.








































15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80
Age of Household Head
Relative Number of Households Average Wealth (in $1000)
Source: Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS), year 2016
Notes: The left y-axis corresponds to the relative number of households with a house-
hold head at a given age cohort, expressed by the blue bars. The right y-axis is the av-
erage wealth of each household in $1000. Hence, the red line maps the average wealth
accumulation of households over the age profile of the household head. Results are
produced using the household level weights.
The proof works by writing the Gini coefficient as a product of the
standardised variation of income, and the correlation of income with its
rank, following Milanovic (1997), and noting that both of these terms
are only zero when income is constant for all ages. The proof itself is in
Appendix A.
Considering that observed inequality is generated by a host of factors,
it seems appropriate to view natural inequality as a benchmark, devia-
tions from which are useful as indicators of life-cycle adjusted measures
10
of inequality. Figure 3 reproduces the conventional graph defining the
Gini coefficient, but with an additional Lorenz curve. The thick curved
line is the life-cycle Lorenz curve – the Lorenz curve associated with the
natural rate – and the dashed line is the actual Lorenz curve. A indicates
the area between the line of equality and the life-cycle Lorenz curve and
B and B′ indicate the areas under the life-cycle and actual Lorenz curves,
respectively. The natural rate Gini can be expressed as: θNR = 1−2B, sim-
ilarly the non-adjusted or conventional Gini coefficient can be expressed
as: θU = 1 − 2B′. Using the graph we can also define the life-cycle ad-





Implying that a society with only natural inequality will have θLA = 0,
while a society exhibiting inequality in excess of natural inequality will
take positive adjusted values.
Focusing on the Paglin (1975) debate about how to properly correct for
age factors in inequality, we can observe that what we call the natural rate
comes closest to what he calls the A(ge)-Gini, which was not the source of
controversy. In fact, it is equivalent to the Modified-Paglin Gini suggested
by Formby and Seaks (1980) and also employed by Formby et al. (1989)
to analyse trends in inequality.4 We seek to build on these earlier insights
by exploiting vastly improved and harmonised data to obtain precise and
4Their modification of the Paglin (1975) measure amounts to redefining the de-
nominator of θLA as B and not A+B.
11




















The solid diagonal line is the conventional line of perfect equality. The solid curve
is the Lorenz curve associated with the natural rate. The dashed curve is the actual
Lorenz curve. A is the area between the two solid lines, and B is the area under the
natural rate Lorenz Curve. B′ is the area under the actual Lorenz curve. The natural
rate Gini can be expressed as: θNR = 1− 2B, similarly the non-adjusted or conventional
Gini coefficient can be expressed as: θU = 1− 2B′ .
comparable estimates of the inequality trends of multiple countries and,
importantly, to predict the development of inequality into the future.
In taking this argument to the data one previously neglected, but im-
portant, subtlety in the computation of the Paglin Gini emerges. This
is the choice of the relevant population, given both unemployment and
endogenous labour market participation. If one includes the entire pop-
ulation as is implicit in the work of Paglin (1975) and Formby and Seaks
(1980) then the income attributed to those unemployed, or not in the
labour market becomes important. As is how the income from shared
assets is attributed. This is true, a fortiori, for our purposes since we are
12
making comparisons across countries and over a period in which disper-
sion in retirement ages has increased.
More concretely, the decision to retire embodies choices that are en-
dogenous with respect to earning potentials as well as societal mores and
institutions. For this reason we analyse the natural rate of inequality for
men solely. We also restrict, as in Figure 1, our analysis to people aged 18-
65 for the purposes of analysing labour income. This minimises concerns
about endogenous selection in to full- or part-time employment once of
retirement age. As per Figure 2 for wealth we consider the entire popu-
lation, but to avoid having to split jointly held assets, choose households
as the unit of analysis.
Our analysis will focus on natural inequality between men. This is be-
cause it is reasonable to assume, as an approximation, that all (or a con-
stant fraction of) men aged 18-65 over the entire period, and all the coun-
tries we study, are in the labour market and thus that earnings of zero
reflect unemployment. This is patently untrue for women, and female
labour market participation rates still vary markedly across developed
countries, and are changing within them, limiting what may be reason-
ably inferred. By focusing on this subpopulation of prime aged men we
are able to abstract from the key labour market changes of the period.
The other key changes are the increase in the share of University Grad-
uates and Skill-biased Technological Change. We note however that ed-
ucation is largely finished by the early to mid 20s for most people and
that there doesn’t seem to be substantial changes in the life-cycle earn-
ings profile over the period. To see this consider Figure 4 below which
reproduces Figure 1 but for comparison overlays the relative population
13
size and income for 1979. The green bars with black outline are the rel-
ative cohort size in 1979 and we can see the larger population share of
the young. Seeing this in contrast with 2016, the blue bars, it is evident
that there has been a substantial demographic shift, whilst comparisons
of the lifecycle earnings distributions suggests that these have remained
similar.








































20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
Age
Relative Cohort Size - 2016 Relative Cohort Size - 1979
Relative Income Size - 2016 Relative Income Size - 1979
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), years 1979, 2016
Notes: The left y-axis corresponds to the relative size of each age cohort for men, the
blue bars refer to 2016 and the green to 1979. The right y-axis in the relative labour in-
come for each age group. Thus the red line maps the average earnings profile for 2016
and the orange for 1979. We can see that the earnings profile has remained similar
over the time period, with the key changes being demographic.
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In sum, taking inspiration from Atkinson (1971), Paglin (1975) and
Formby and Seaks (1980) this section has sought to reinvigorate the argu-
ment that a stylized economy populated by individuals who are equal to
each other at every stage of the life-cycle displays a substantial degree of
income and wealth inequality. Moreover, we have seen that this measure
can be used to calculate a life-cycle adjusted Gini coefficient.
II. Inequality in an Equal Society
This section empirically assesses the quantitative importance of natu-
ral inequality. First for the United States and then for a cross-section of
developed countries.
A. Inequality in the United States
For clarity, and in line with much of the focus of the literature, e.g.
Piketty and Saez (2003), Saez and Zucman (2016), we begin our analy-
sis by focusing on the United States, using the LIS data, the details of
which may be found in Appendix B. We use these data in preference
to the World Income Database Alvaredo et al. (2016) because they con-
tain the necessary detailed microdata. Similarly, the register data used
by Alma˚s et al. (2011a) because we wish to study a range of countries for
a sufficiently long period. Consider first the solid red line in Figure 5,
this shows the Gini coefficient of labour income for the period 1974 to
2016 while the blue dashed line shows the Gini coefficient of total in-
come for the same period. The most striking feature is the pronounced
and consistent upwards trend over the period. The Gini was 0.36 for
labour income and just above 0.39 for total income in 1974 and 0.48 and
0.50 respectively in 2016. Also clear, is that inequality in labour income
15
has increased more than that of total income, with total income experi-
encing a less steep upward trend. For both series, it is apparent that the
biggest growth in inequality was experienced in the period 1974 to 1995.
While the trend is clear, there is also a substantial cyclical component, as
as shown more generally by Milanovic (2016). Finally, we can note that
the growth in inequality is faster from 2000 onwards for both series.









1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Labour Income Total Income
Source: Authors’ calculations using Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)
Notes: The graph shows trends over time in unadjusted Gini. Labour Income (solid
line) includes those aged 18-65 and total income (dashed line) includes those aged 18-
78. For both time series we exclude individuals with a zero or negative income. Results
are calculated using individual weights.
We now analyse the extent to which these changes in inequality re-
flect demographic changes. Figure 6 plots, for labour income, both ac-
16
tual (green circles) and natural inequality (blue diamonds), as well as our
two measures of the difference: excess (red squares) and adjusted (purple
triangles). As outlined in Section I, the natural inequality (from which
excess and adjusted inequality are derived) is calculated by determining
the Gini coefficient of average incomes by age. We can see that natural
inequality increased from 1974 to the the mid 1990’s by around 2 per-
centage points. Before falling, by almost 5 percentage points over the
rest of the period to 2016.
Figure 6 : Actual, Natural, and Excess Gini Coefficients of Labour In-







1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Gini Natural Rate Gini
Excess Inequality Life-cycle Adjusted Gini
Source: Authors’ calculations using Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) US 1974 - 2016.
Notes: Sample includes Men with positive income and are aged 18-65. Results are
calculated using individual weights.
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Figure 7 : Actual, Natural, and Excess Gini Coefficients of Total Income







1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Gini Natural Rate Gini
Excess Inequality Life-cycle Adjusted Gini
Source: Authors’ calculations using Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) US 1974 -2016.
Notes: Sample includes Men aged 18-78. We exclude individuals with a zero or nega-
tive income. Results are calculated using individual weights.
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Considering actual, natural, excess, and adjusted Ginis in Figure 6 to-
gether it is clear that while inequality increased only modestly from 1974
to 1990, this was in spite of a growth in natural inequality. In the late
1970s half on inequality was natural. On the other hand, the substantial
increase in labour income inequality since the mid-1990s has been de-
spite falling natural inequality. Excess inequality has rapidly increased.
The difference between these two periods is important as it makes plain
the quantitative importance of our argument. Ignoring the role of demo-
graphic change in generating variations in the natural rate of inequality
can lead us to overstate the increase in inequality over the last 25 years.
Equally, it leads us to understate it for the previous 25, and thus also to
understate the difference between the two periods.
Comparison with Figure 7 shows that these results are robust to al-
ternatively considering inequality in total income (calculated over those
aged 18-78). In both cases excess inequality accounts for around three
quarters of prevailing inequality in the US – the adjusted Gini is around
0.35 for labour income and 0.40 for total income. Moreover, trends in the
two have been similar over the period with a substantial increase, par-
ticularly in the period since 1990. One interesting feature of the data is
that the frequency with which natural and excess inequality vary are no-
ticeably different. Changes in natural inequality are of lower frequency
than changes in excess inequality which is known to be cyclical Milanovic
(2016), perhaps as expected given the gradual nature of demographic
change. Thus, changes in the natural rate are of most importance when
analysing the evolution of inequality over substantial periods of time.
19
B. Cross Sectional Time Series Analysis
We now broaden the discussion to a sample of countries with sufficient
time series available from LIS to conduct a meaningful study of trends
over time. Figure 8 summarises the cross country variation in wave IX of
the LIS for all of the countries we consider.
Natural inequality is blue, and excess inequality is red. The sum of
these gives actual inequality in labour income, reported to the right of
each bar. The most obvious feature of the data is the substantial vari-
ation in actual inequality, between 0.49 for the US or Canada and 0.30
for Hungary or Italy. This variation is continuous, meaning that there
are no obvious ‘groups’ in the data. Secondly, we note that there is sim-
ilarly large variation in excess inequality. For example, actual inequal-
ity in Spain or Germany is similar, but excess inequality is much higher
in Spain. Alternatively, if Spain had the same demographics as the US,
it would be nearly as unequal. Conversely, while natural inequality in
Slovenia is similar to that in Spain, excess inequality is around 7 percent-
age points lower. Thus, cross-country comparisons of actual inequality
may be misleading. France and Finland have the same actual Gini, but
excess inequality in France is higher, and thus perhaps more amenable to
policy. This emphasises that as well as being important in understanding
variation over time, separating natural and excess inequality is crucial to
a nuanced understanding of cross-country variation in income inequality.
In moving on to consider both cross sectional and time series variation
we, initially, restrict our attention to a subset of the countries for which
20












































Natural Rate of Inequality Excess Inequality
Source: Authors’ calculations using LIS Wave IX, (circa 2013)
Notes: The number to the right of the bars for each country denotes the actual Gini,
and the total length of the bar. Thus this graph shows the decomposition of the level
of actual inequality into its natural component (Blue) and excess inequality (red). All
data are for gross incomes, apart from for Israel and Slovenia which are net, and Italy
and France which are mixed. Individual level weights are used in all cases. Sample
includes men ages 18-65 with positive labour incomes.
sufficient data are available in the LIS, as reported in Figure 8.5 As well
as focusing on those for which the data provide for a sufficient time series
to look at the trends in inequality, we also limit our sample to a group of
countries designed to be representative while ensuring clarity. To ensure
comparability we prioritise countries for which gross income informa-
5Data are for wave IX of the LIS data, with the exception of France and Ireland
where the data is for wave IIX. Mexico is excluded as the last wave available is wave
VI.
21
tion is available. The countries which we discuss here are Canada, (West)
Germany, Netherlands, Taiwan, United Kingdom and Spain.6 The United
States is presented again in order to make a comparison with other coun-
tries. We discuss regression analyses of the trends for the full set of coun-
tries below. Figures describing the other countries are available in the
appendix.
We begin by considering labour income. Looking at the top left (green)
panel of Figure 9, we can see that the actual Gini coefficient in the US
is high compared to the other countries we consider, particularly at the
beginning of our sample period. However, the gap has narrowed and all
countries have experienced rising inequality. Looking closer, it is clear
that the biggest changes have been in Spain, the Netherlands, and Ger-
many. In comparison, the US and Taiwan seem to have experienced rela-
tively stable levels of inequality in labour income.
This finding is cast in new light when we consider the natural rates of
inequality presented in the top-right (blue) panel of Figure 9. While nat-
ural inequality is stable on average, this masks comparatively notable in-
creases for Spain, Germany and the Netherlands. This suggests that the
similar trends in inequality have different sources in the US than else-
where.
This difference is clearer when we consider adjusted inequality, dis-
played in Figure 9 in the bottom-right (purple) panel. Now we can see
that the US has seen a substantial increase in adjusted inequality, both
starting and finishing the period at a higher level of adjusted inequal-
6Results for Germany are for West Germany only throughout. Figures for Spain are
for net incomes. Results for all other countries are for gross incomes. See Appendix B
for more information.
22




































































1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Year
Canada Germany Spain Netherlands
Taiwan UK USA
Source: Authors’ calculations using LIS data.
Notes: All results are calculated using data on gross incomes with the exception of
Spain which are net incomes (with exception of wave IX). We consider those aged be-
tween 18-65 and who have positive earnings. Results are calculated using individual
level weights.
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ity than elsewhere. Taiwan is notable in that adjusted inequality has re-
mained relatively stable over the sample period. Other countries, such
as the the UK and Canada, have seen rapid growth rates of adjusted in-
equality similar to those in the US, albeit from lower initial levels. In
general, the rate of increase was relatively slow everywhere until the mid
1980s after which it accelerated. The similarities in these trends, allow-
ing for different starting points, suggests that rises in excess inequality
may be driven by technological and policy changes common across the
developed nations.
To demonstrate that our results are not specific to the countries plot-
ted, Table 1 reports the results of estimating a linear trend using a simple
fixed-effects model.7 We report results for both total income and labour
income in the first and second rows respectively. Hence, the first column
reports results for the actual Gini in a model in which the trends are as-
sumed to be homogenous across countries: yit = τ × t+ µi + it. For both
income and labour income the slope is positive and precisely estimated,
reflecting the secular upwards trend in inequality. The second column
reports estimates from the mean-group estimator of Pesaran and Smith
(1995) in which the reported coefficients are the averages of the coeffi-
cients from separate regressions for each country: yit = τi×t+µi+it. The
results are qualitatively unchanged. Inspection of the individual slopes
makes clear that virtually all countries exhibit positive and significant
trends.8 This provides broader support for the previous finding of con-
sistent upwards trends. However, as above, there are differences between
7Given the small number of observations, these simple estimators are preferred to
more sophisticated alternatives.
8These are reported in Table C.1 in the appendix.
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Table 1: Time Trends in Inequality
Actual Adjusted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Labour Income 0.37∗∗∗0.39∗∗∗0.32∗∗∗0.32∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Total Income 0.32∗∗∗0.34∗∗∗0.33∗∗∗0.32∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Estimator FE MG FE MG
Countries 22 22 22 22
N 216 216 216 216
FE Estimator denotes the standard fixed-effects
estimator with an homogenous time trend, with
robust standard errors in parenthesis. MG denotes
the mean-group estimator of Pesaran and Smith
(1995) using the outlier-robust mean of coefficients,
with standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
labour and total income. Using both estimators, the results using adjusted
inequality as the dependent variable suggest that, for total income, it is
increasing at the same rate as actual inequality. This again highlights that
the increasing importance of adjusted inequality in the US is an outlier.
However, for labour income it is clear that adjusted inequality cannot ex-
plain all of the increase in actual inequality. There is a gap of between 5
(FE estimates) and 7 percentage points (MG), which suggests that around
a quarter of increases in inequality have been due to demographic change.
C. Wealth Inequality
As well as increases in income inequality, the prior literature has shown
that increases in wealth inequality have tended to be even larger than
those in income inequality. To understand the role of demographics in
this pattern, we repeat our prior analysis for wealth using the Luxem-
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bourg Wealth Study (LWS).9 These data, like the LIS, are harmonised
cross country data. Although the LWS does not have the coverage of the
LIS we are able to construct a limited time series for the United States and
make cross-sectional comparisons for a number of other countries, which
we have discussed with respect to income inequality and are available in
the LWS data. The choice of data is a delicate one, the LWS data are top-
coded, unfortunately the WID data (Alvaredo et al., 2016) which contain
much better information on the very wealthy do not contain sufficient age
data.
We choose disposable net worth (non-financial assets plus financial as-
sets (excluding pensions) minus total liabilities) as our measure of wealth
but this choice is not important for our results.10 Wealth data are mea-
sured by the household rather at the individual level, because of this we
use the head of the household’s age as a proxy, in favour of attempting
to divide assets within the household. Again, this assumption does not
matter for our results.
Figure 10 shows the (actual) Gini coefficient of wealth inequality for
the United States over the period 1995 − 2016. As expected wealth in-
equality is higher than income inequality over the same period. We can
see that while inequality has been increasing, that the natural Gini in-
creased only marginally, and that consequently excess and life-cycle ad-
justed Gini have risen more markedly. More precisely, the excess Gini of
9Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS) Database, http://www.lisdatacenter.org (mul-
tiple countries; 1995-2016). Luxembourg: LIS. Refer to appendix B for a data descrip-
tion.
10We drop the top 1% of the distribution to limit the effects of topcoding proce-
dures in the original datasets. Similar results are obtained with the alternative of inter-
polating the true values of the topcoded observations assuming a Pareto distribution as
in Heathcote et al. (2010).
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wealth has increased by around ten percentage points over the 20 year
period. Of course, our focus on the Gini coefficient is in contrast to much
of the literature which uses concentration indices such as the share of the
top 1%. Unlike those measures, our approach here will fail to capture
much of the changes at the top end of the income distribution. But, im-
portantly it is more sensitive to changes amongst the moderately wealthy.
However, it is clear that while demographics can account for a substantial
fraction of changes in income inequality they are comparatively unimpor-
tant for wealth. Changing demography cannot explain the stark increase
in wealth inequality over the last few decades.
Table 2 shows results for the ten countries for which wealth data are
available. We can see that the wealth inequality varies substantially, be-
tween 0.53 in Slovenia and 0.82 in the US. However, the second and third
columns suggest that this variation is in part driven by variations in the
natural rate. This is 0.38 in the US but only 0.14 in Slovenia, and excess
inequality is relatively consistent compared to actual inequality varying
between 0.35 in Australia for the US to 0.45 in the US. Comparing the US
and Canada is instructive as while the actual Gini coefficients are quite
different (0.82 and 0.68 respectively) the excess Ginis are very similar
(0.45 and 0.44). Thus, abstracting from life-cycle effects both societies (at
least on this basis) are similarly unequal, and the US appears less of an
outlier. This highlights, again, that considering the actual Gini alone may
be misleading.
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1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Year
Unadjusted Gini Coefficient Natural Rate of Inequality
Excess Inequality Life-cycle Adjusted Gini
Source: Authors’ calculations using Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS)
Notes: Time series for United States, the underlying data are from the Survey of Con-
sumer Finances and the wealth measure used is disposable net worth. The sample
includes all households who have a head who is aged 18-78 including those who are
recorded as having zero or negative net worth. Household level weights are used to
produce results.
III. Inequality and the Baby Boom
We have seen that individual life-cycles have a central role in under-
standing inequality. An implication of this is that demographic dynamics
will lead to changes in the distributions of income and wealth. Economists
have paid considerable attention recently to long-run trends in inequal-
ity, prominent studies include Piketty (2003), Piketty and Saez (2003),
Piketty (2011), Piketty and Saez (2014) and Roine and Waldenstro¨m (2015).
In this section we ask: what is going to happen to natural rates of inequal-
ity, over the next forty years as the Baby Boom generation passes, and
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Table 2: Wealth Inequality
Actual Natural Excess Adjusted
Austria 0.66 0.22 0.43 0.56
Australia 0.58 0.23 0.35 0.45
Canada 0.68 0.24 0.44 0.58
Germany 0.76 0.27 0.49 0.67
Finland 0.62 0.24 0.38 0.50
Italy 0.55 0.16 0.39 0.47
Norway 0.76 0.37 0.39 0.61
Slovenia 0.53 0.14 0.40 0.46
UK 0.58 0.23 0.35 0.45
US 0.82 0.38 0.45 0.72
Actual is the conventional Gini coefficient. Natural, Ex-
cess, and Adjusted are the alternative measures of inequal-
ity defined in Section I. Results are rounded to two deci-
mal points. Results for Austria and Australia refer to 2014,
Canada and Germany refer to 2012, Italy and Slovenia refer
to 2014, Finland and Norway refer to 2013, the US refer to
2016, and the UK to 2011.
the demographic structure returns towards its long-run equilibrium? We
find that this return ceteris paribus will increase the natural rate of in-
equality for most countries in our sample, and thus may lead to increases
in overall inequality.
The Baby Boom generation, for the US commonly considered those
born between 1946 and 1964, represented a temporary upwards devi-
ation from developed countries’ otherwise stable demographic trajecto-
ries. This can be seen in Figure 11 which reports long-run fertility data
for a selection of countries. A first observation is that the Baby Boom was
a common feature across many developed countries.11 Although, there
are variations in timing and magnitude these fail to mask the overall scale
11All data are from the Human Fertility Database (2013). Germany refers to West
Germany only, France excludes the overseas territories. The ‘Average’ series is the an-
nual arithmetic mean of available observations.
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of the boom - nearly an extra child per woman for 18 years. Also, notable
is the rapidity with which it began and ended. This large, sudden, and in
demographic terms brief, rise in fertility has led to a one generation dis-
tortion in the demographic structure of the affected societies. This shock
to the demographic pyramid provides an interesting natural experiment
for us to study as the demographics return to their long run steady state
following the departure of the Baby Boom generation. Our analysis sug-
gests that recent increases in natural inequality will be permanent, and
continue as the share of Baby Boomers in the labour market and overall
population declines, with increases of up to 10 percent in inequality as
societies return to the demographic steady-state.
Future Levels of Inequality
In order to study the impact of the Baby Boomers we simulate future
population cohort sizes using age specific data on birth rates, death rates,
and population cohort size. We do this using the standard Leslie matrix
approach, in which the birth and death rates define a transition matrix
that projects the cohort sizes next period given the current sizes. Then,
because the natural rate of inequality only requires cohort or age-group
specific income shares, we can then use the projected cohort sizes to scale
these income shares, giving estimates of natural inequality under the new
demographics. This process can be repeated to obtain projected demo-
graphics at any given time horizon.
We make two key assumptions for this exercise. Firstly, that the life-
cycle earnings profile is be stationary. Secondly, we fix the relative size
of the working cohort sizes. That is, we assume that the labour market
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1920 1946 1964 1980 2000
Year
Austria Canada Germany Finland
Netherlands Sweden United States Average
Source: Authors’ calculations using data are from the Human Fertility Database
(HFD), 2013.
Notes: The y-axis reports the number of children born per woman in a given year. The
blue line is the (unweighted) mean fertility rate across the six countries reported. The
red line highlights the USA for clarity but is otherwise identical in construction to
those for other countries. The dotted vertical lines indicate the beginning and end of
the baby-boom.
participation and unemployment rates will remain fixed for each cohort
over time. We are asking ceteris paribus what will happen to the level
of natural rate inequality in a society in the future if all that is going
to change is relative cohort sizes. In particular, we can expect to see the
society returning to its normal demographic pyramid following the shock
of the Baby Boom generation. This assumption entails also not making
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any inference regarding expected immigration. Thus we are assuming
that this will be such that the relative size of the working cohort is fixed.



















































































0 10 20 30 40
Netherlands
Source: Simulations use data from the Human Mortality Database (2013) and Human
Fertility Database (2013) and earnings profiles are taken from the most recent data
available in the LIS database.
Notes: On the y-axis is the Natural Gini Coefficient and time (years in the future) is on
the x-axis. We project the population distribution for up to 40 years in the future by
which time all societies will be extremely close to their steady state.
Thus, for the 15 countries for which suitable fertility and mortality data
are available, and are part if the LIS data, we project expected levels of
natural labour income inequality. Figure 12 plots projected natural in-
equality for the next forty years. We choose this horizon as by this point
the children of the Baby Boomers have largely left the labour market and
so the population will be approaching its steady-state. The key predic-
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tion is that in almost all countries natural inequality will remain at its
current level or increase. A second prediction is that natural inequality
will be much less volatile than in the past, although other than in the
United States and Norway it will continue to fluctuate. Both of these re-
sults are consistent with our intuitions, as the Baby Boomers either have
now retired or will do in the next few years. Seemingly, in the past the
presence of the Baby Boomers reduced natural inequality, offsetting and
thus masking increases in adjusted inequality. Any future rises in ad-
justed inequality will translate directly into increased overall inequality.
A second prediction concerns the timing of the fluctuations, which are
expected to be largest around twenty years from now, when mortality
rates for the Baby Boomers will be highest. This effect seems particularly
pronounced for France, Germany, Spain and Britain. To further look at
how these projections compare with the historical data, we plot them to-
gether in Figure 13 along with a line of best fit denoted by the red line.12
The vertical red dashed line represents the point at which the simula-
tion starts. To the left of this line are the historical results from LIS, and
points to the right are the projected levels of inequality. Taken together it
seems that future increases in natural inequality would represent a con-
tinuation of the historical trend. Historically, this presumably reflects the
increased numbers of older people in the population due to improved
health, and it is important to note that any continued improvements will
likely increase natural inequality further. Most countries are forecast to
experience a five to ten percentage points increase in the natural rate rel-
ative to the 1980’s by the 2040’s. This suggests that in the absence of
12The reduced set of countries reflects data availability.
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more migration or changes in fertility patterns that there is unlikely to be
any reduction in natural inequality, to offset trends in excess inequality,
in the foreseeable future.





































































1980 2000 2020 2040
Netherlands
Source: Simulations use data from the Human Mortality Database (2013) and Human
Fertility Database (2013). Historical data are taken from the LIS, the Earnings profiles
for the projections are taken from the final wave of the LIS.
Notes: On the y-axis is the Natural Gini Coefficient and the x-axis plots the year. The
dashed vertical red line signals the end of the historical LIS results and the beginning




Even a society in which everybody is the same at the same stage of the
life-cycle will exhibit a substantial degree of income and wealth inequal-
ity. In this paper we take this notion to the data in order to quantify
the share of observed income and wealth inequality that is attributable
to life-cycle profiles of income and wealth. The data reveal that natu-
ral inequality is a substantial component of actual inequality. Treating
the natural rate as the benchmark, and thus analysing excess or adjusted
inequality suggests that recent increases in income inequality in the US
are both larger than the actual rate would suggest, and represent a dis-
tinct change from the period pre-1990. It is also clear that natural in-
equality is of first-order importance in understanding variation in other
developed countries and the variation between them. A similar analysis
for wealth inequality suggests that natural inequality is less important
a determinant than it is for income, and a much smaller component of
actual wealth inequality. It similarly explains less of the cross country
variation. To home in on the role of the demographic structure for in-
equality we close our analysis by focusing on the impact of the bulge on
the demographic pyramid generated by the Baby Boom generation. This
shows that the as cohort shares transition back into their long-run equi-
librium levels, natural inequalities of income will fluctuate and reach a
new higher level of steady state natural rate inequality.
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A. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1. Focusing on income inequality and following Mi-
















where W , σW are the mean and standard deviation of individual income
W , rW is the rank of a specific income levelW and ρ(W ,rW ) is the correla-
tion of W with its rank rW . To proceed, observe that ρ(W ,rW ) ∈ [0,1] and
that ρ(W ,rW ) = 0 if and only if W =W ∀W , otherwise ρ(W ,rW ) ∈ (0,1].
In combination with the fact that σW ≥ 0 but also σW = 0 if and only
if W = W ∀W , implies that as longs as the set W , W is non-empty
θ(W ) > 0. Results for the Gini Coefficient of Wealth can be established
with the same arguments. 
B. Data Appendix
Luxembourg Income Study Database (LIS)
The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) provides a harmonised data set of
microdata recording a broad range of economic and demographic char-
acteristics drawn from various nationally representative surveys. Data
are compiled at both the individual and household levels. For each wave,
from each country, LIS takes data for the individual and the household
level, with variables relating to socio-demographics, household charac-
teristics, labour market and flow variables. The individual file is made
up of the members of the households included in the household level
files, where their individual observations regarding income and expendi-
39
ture are summed to create the household aggregate information. For our
purposes we use the individual level income data only.
The harmonisation procedure involves two main components. Firstly,
ensuring the variables are comparable in terms of their definitions and
in the coding convention applied, for example with respect to categorical
variables. Secondly, missing values are processed to ensure both a con-
sistent coding across countries and waves, but also given the differing
questions asked by each national survey-wave where possible missing
data are derived from the available data. For example, if the underly-
ing survey does not contain information about unemployment but does
contain sufficient employment data then unemployment data is derived
appropriately.
The datasets produced by LIS are representative of the total popula-
tion of that country for the given year. To this end the most appropriate
weights provided by the original surveys are selected, and where nec-
essary missing individual or household level weights are derived using
the provided weighting data. The key criteria for the choice of weight
variable, is that they deliver nationally representative results and in the
cases where there is a choice of these priority is given to those which are
designed to accurately capture the population income distribution.
We consider two main income variables from the LIS datasets taken
from the individual level data files. These values are corrected for infla-
tion by LIS using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Personal Monetary Income This is the total monetary income that an
individual receives from labour and transfers. As such it is akin to the
pre-tax total income in the CPS, and we will refer to it as Total Income.
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Labour Monetary Income Labour income includes any monetary pay-
ments received from employment, in addition any profits or losses accru-
ing from self employment.
We can additionally consider both the value monetary and non-monetary
income however not all data sets are as good as reporting non-monetary
income so this component maybe under reported in many cases. Regard-
less of this difference we can find similar results for both monetary and
non-monetary incomes. We limit the age range consider to 18-78 when
using personal monetary income, and to 18-65 for labour monetary in-
come.
The LIS classifies each data set depending on the kind of income that
the host data provider report. These groups are either gross, net, or mixed.
A majority of the datasets are gross, that is the income amounts reported
are gross of income taxes and social security employer contributions. This
is contrasted to the net datasets which there is no information provided
regarding taxes and other contributions. Finally, mixed datasets where
that taxes and contribution data is not sufficiently available to be purely
classified as either gross or net.
Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS)
Our estimates of wealth inequality use data from the Luxembourg Wealth
Study Database (LWS) . This combines representative national surveys on
the basis of the same principles as the LIS, producing harmonised cross
country data. A key difference is that wealth variables are measured at
the level of the household unit. Therefore, we need to assign an ‘age’ to
each household to calculate natural and adjusted inequality. To do so, we
use the age of the head of household. This choice is unimportant for our
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results. All of our estimates are produced using the weights provided
by LWS, and we allow net wealth to be negative. Wealth data are often
top-coded and the wealthy are often oversampled due to higher rates of
non-response. This can mean, given the small number of very wealth in-
dividuals, that results may not be truly representative. To address bias
due to this we drop the top 1% of wealth observations in each country.
Data for the United States are drawn from the Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances (SCF) and so we follow the approach of Heathcote et al. (2010)








































































1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Year
Canada Germany Spain Netherlands
Taiwan UK USA
Source: Authors’ calculations using LIS data.
Notes: All results are calculated using data on gross incomes with the exception of
Spain which are net incomes (with exception of wave IX). We consider ages 18-78 for
total income and who have positive earnings. Results are calculated using individual
level weights.
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Table C.1: Country Specific Trend Estimates
Actual Adjusted
Country Total Labour Total Labour N
Austria 0.74*** 0.80*** 0.67*** 0.75*** 7
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14)
Australia 0.55*** 0.41*** 0.51*** 0.35*** 10
(0.12) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Canada 0.27*** 0.52*** 0.24*** 0.48*** 11
(0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.03)
Czech Republic 0.31* 0.41 *** 0.23 0.22** 7
(0.14) (0.07) (0.12) (0.09)
Germany 0.39** 0.44*** 0.29*** 0.32*** 27
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Denmark 0.06 0.23*** 0.07** 0.20*** 8
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
Spain 0.32** 0.31** 0.39*** 0.34** 8
(0.09) (0.13) (0.07) (0.12)
Finland -0.01 0.05 -0.05*** -0.06 8
(0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
France 0.17 0.33** 0.10 0.24 7
(0.19) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15)
Hungary -0.27*** -0.39*** -0.06 -0.27*** 8
(0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06)
Ireland 0.75*** 0.70*** 0.92*** 0.83*** 7
(0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
Israel 0.41*** 0.43*** 0.29*** 0.26*** 11
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Italy 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.52*** 0.27*** 12
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07)
Luxembourg 0.51*** 0.61*** 0.53*** 0.57*** 9
(0.09) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06)
Mexico 0.59*** 0.40** 0.62*** 0.40*** 9
(0.12) (0.13) (0.07) (0.07)
Netherlands 0.36*** 0.62*** 0.35*** 0.45*** 9
(0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Norway -0.15** 0.27*** -0.21** 0.19*** 9
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.02)
Poland 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.35** 0.30** 8
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08)
Slovenia 0.32** 0.30* 0.08 0.16 6
(0.07) (0.14) 0.10 0.10
Taiwan 0.16** 0.14*** 0.05 0.13* 11
(0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07)
United Kingdom 0.28** 0.50*** 0.48*** 0.51*** 12
(0.09) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
United States 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.40*** 0.35*** 12
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Coefficients are country specific time trends obtained using the
Mean Group estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995). See Table 1
for further details.
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1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Year
Israel Italy Luxembourg Mexico
Norway Poland Slovenia
Source: Authors’ calculations using LIS data.
Notes: These are the countries for which a sufficient time series is available not re-
ported in Figure 9. Note that, however, data for these other countries are not con-
sistently classified as gross or net. Most datasets are classified as Gross. France is all
classed as mixed and Slovenia is classed as Net. Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Israel,
Italy, Luxembourg and Poland do not have a consistent classification over the time se-
ries. All others are for gross income. We consider Men aged between 18-78 and who
have positive income. Results are calculated using individual level weights.
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Notes: These are the countries for which a sufficient time series is available not re-
ported in Figure 9. Note that, however, data for these other countries are not con-
sistently classified as gross or net. Most datasets are classified as Gross. France is all
classed as mixed and Slovenia is classed as Net. Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Israel,
Italy, Luxembourg and Poland do not have a consistent classification over the time se-
ries. All others are for gross income. We consider Men aged between 18-65 and who
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